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Abstract—EMV (Europay MasterCard Visa) is the technical
international protocol implemented to secure the communication,
between a client’s payment device and a PoS (Point of Sale),
during a contact or contactless-NFC purchase transaction. In
this paper, we are interested in examining the reliability of this
protocol.
Index Terms—EMV protocol, EMV vulnerabilities, NFC tech-
nology, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The bank card is considered today as the fastest and most
convenient means of payment in Europe according to the
studies [1] [2] [3] [4]. It has much utility and advantages over
cash and other payment methods because it [5] [6] [7] [8]
[9]: includes insurance and assistance, is simple to obtain by
banks, is small in size and easy to carry (we can keep it in a
safe place to be protected), stores in a secure manner critical
banking data that are needed primarily to:
− Perform online payments, make in-store purchases either
by magnetic stripe, with contact or contactless based on
the NFC (Near Field Communication) technology, deposit
or withdraw cash money from an ATM (Automated Teller
Machine).
Accordingly, the clients consider the bank card as a crucial
and "magical" solution to safely manage their funds. In fact,
they assume that this "magic" card is very secure and reliable
because it securely stores the critical banking data in a smart
chip, which is a sophisticated electronic system offering a
highly secure environment [6]. However, authors in the studies
[10] [11] [12] [13] and [14] prove that this assumption is not
completely accurate by demonstrating the following attack:
"A malicious adversary can use an NFC reader to steal the
banking data, remotely, from an NFC bank card, without the
knowledge of the cardholder and without stealing the physical
card". So, this kind of attack has raised our attention to ask
the question: (*) How this attack can be produced ?
In this paper, we are interested to address the aforemen-
tioned question (*) and for this, it is mandatory to examine
how the bank card can send in clear the banking data,
using NFC radio waves, to an NFC reader. Indeed, it is the
Europay MasterCard Visa (EMV) standard which is by default
responsible to secure the communication, during a contact
or an NFC payment transaction, between a client’s payment
device (a bank card or an NFC smartphone emulating a bank
card) and a PoS (Point of Sale). Therefore, in order to answer
the question (*), we will examine the reliability and safety of
the EMV standard by surveying a set of research papers that
have identified several security vulnerabilities in this standard.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present
a survey of the EMV security vulnerabilities. In section III, we
discuss the possible attacks due these vulnerabilities whereas
in section IV, we illustrate three experimental tests that we
have performed during this work. The last section concludes
this paper.
II. EMV SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
According to the EMV specifications in [15]–[21], the
EMV payment system includes five actors that communicate
together in order to secure an EMV contact/contactless-NFC
purchase transaction: Payment Scheme (PS), Issuing Bank
(IB), Client’s Payment Device (C), Acquiring Bank (AB) and a
Point of Sale (PoS). The role of each EMV actor is described
in our previous work [6] and [7]. Then, during a payment
transaction, these EMV actors exchange with each other a
sequence of security messages that are divided into four
phases: Initialization (Phase 1), Authentication of C to PoS
(Phase 2), Authentication of the Client (Phase 3) and, Actual
Transaction (Phase 4). Each phase is explained in detail in our
previous work [5], [6], [7] and [22].
In this section, we examine the reliability of the EMV proto-
col by presenting the most well-known security vulnerabilities
that have been identified in literature for each EMV phase [23]
[24]. We note that for any detail or information concerning
the EMV phases or EMV actors, it is essential to consult the
references [5], [6], [7] and [22].
A. In Phase "Initialization"
• V ulnerability (1):
To make any C device compatible with any PoS device,
the EMV primary negotiation phase (initialization) is re-
quired. The messages exchanged in this phase are neither
signed nor enciphered by PoS or by C. Consequently, the
studies [25] and [26] show that this phase presents an
important vulnerability in the EMV standard, where it
is possible for an attacker (man-in-the-middle) to exploit
this vulnerability and modify the abilities of C or PoS to
put PoS in a weak position. This type of attack is called
Downgrade Attack. See section III-A: 1st, 2nd, 9th
Attacks.
• V ulnerability (2):
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The studies [10] [11] [13] [12] [14] show that the
EMV protocol fails to guarantee two important security
properties in the EMV phase 1 during a contact or
an NFC purchase transaction. Therefore, two security
vulnerabilities are detected:
• V ulnerability (2.1): the confidentiality of the banking
data is not ensured: the PAN (Primary Account Num-
ber) and ExpDate (Expiration date) are sent in clear
from C to PoS.
• V ulnerability (2.2): with the detection of the
V ulnerability (2.1), also the authentication of PoS
is not ensured to C. The latter can answer any device
without authenticating it, by sending the banking data
in clear.
Indeed, only the authentication of C to PoS which is well
ensured in the EMV phase 2 (if it is executed). Con-
sequently, an attacker can exploit the V ulnerabilities
(2.1) and (2.2) to steal the banking data (see 3rd, 4th,
5th Attacks, in section III-A) and use them to harm the
victims (see 6th, 7th, 8th Attacks, in section III-A).
B. In Phase "Authentication of C to PoS"
• V ulnerability (3):
Because of the V ulnerability (1) in the initialization
phase, the attack which is called "YES cards" attack
may still be applicable at certain offline PoS devices
despite the integration of DDA (Dynamic Data Authenti-
cation)/CDA (Combined Data Authentication) methods to
prevent cloning of the SDA (Static Data Authentication)
signature [14] [25] [26]. In section III-A, the 9th Attack
illustrates this case of vulnerability.
C. In Phase "Authentication of the Client"
• V ulnerability (4):
In the EMV phase 3, the response of C, indicating if
the PIN (Personal Identification Number) code entered
is correct or not, is not authenticated by PoS. Authors
in the study [27] show that this lack of authentication
is a vulnerability in the EMV phase 3 and demonstrate
the 10th Attack exploiting it: see section III-A. Indeed,
the 10th Attack cannot be detected in the EMV phase
4 neither by C, nor by PoS nor by IB, which leads to a
new vulnerability in this phase (see next section II-D).
D. In Phase "Actual Transaction"
• V ulnerability (5):
In the same study [27] that presents V ulnerability (4)
and the 10th Attack, authors show that this attack cannot
be detected in the actual transaction phase because of
another EMV vulnerability that is: an ambiguity in the
encoding TVR (Terminal Verification Results) and IAD
(Issuer Application Data). Indeed, the TVR and the IAD
contain the results of the EMV phase 3 respectively
carried out by PoS and C. C includes the TVR and the
IAD in the cryptogram ’TC (Transaction Certificate) or
ARQC (Authorization ReQuest Cryptogram)’ intended to
’PoS or IB’. According to EMV specifications [15] [16]
[17] [18] [19]:
– In the TVR, the byte of phase 3 is set, by PoS, to 1
only if the PIN verification has been attempted and has
failed.
– In the IAD, the byte of phase 3 is set, by C, to 1 only
if the PIN verification has been attempted.
However, the TVR and the IAD do not define their bytes
to 1 in the cases: PIN verification has been successful,
PIN verification has not been attempted, the handwritten
signature has been chosen. Therefore, in order to better
understand this vulnerability, see the 10th Attack.
III. POSSIBLE ATTACKS
A. Attacks Due to EMV Vulnerabilities
In fact, due to the EMV vulnerabilities, many attacks are
possible. Therefore, in this section, we discuss some attacks
for each EMV vulnerability.
• Because of the V ulnerability (1):
– 1st Attack: According to EMV specifications [15]
[16] [17] [18] [19], an NFC purchase transaction
should not be accepted if an attacker uses a cloned NFC
card, because the original secret key of the original
NFC bank card cannot be copied. However, in the
work [25], authors demonstrate that an attacker who
happens to clone an NFC bank card (without copying
the original secret key), can modify the capabilities
of the cloned NFC card to fool PoS into executing a
magnetic stripe transaction (used in the United States)
rather than an NFC transaction [14]. We specify that
this attack is possible only if C is a bank card (from
MasterCard) and not an NFC smartphone.
– 2nd Attack: in the research work [26], authors show
that an attacker can convince PoS that the chosen CVM
(Cardholder Verification Method) is the offline plain-
text PIN rather than the offline enciphered PIN. Then
, he can easily record the PIN code.
• Because of the V ulnerability (2):
– 3rd Attack: by default, for a contact or an NFC pur-
chase transaction, the professional PoS (big merchants)
prints two payment proofs: one proof for the client
containing the PAN and ExpDate truncated for safety
and security reasons, the second proof for the merchant
containing the PAN and ExpDate in clear, which
serves to ensure the traceability of the client’s purchase
transaction in the future [7]. However, a thief can easily
steal the merchant’s receipts and obtain the banking
data of several clients insofar as the merchants [28]: -
generally do not protect these proofs conscientiously,
- will not need these proofs anymore, every 12-13
months, and they will be able to throw them away. In
section IV-A, we will illustrate the experiment that we
have done in our work to show the content of receipts
printed by a PoS device.
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– 4th Attack: in the case of small merchants, the mobile
PoS is less secure than the professional PoS, because
during a contact or an NFC purchase transaction, the
merchant’s smartphone receives the banking data from
the mobile PoS without encryption: android’s attackers
can then retrieve the banking data [29] [30].
– 5th Attack: recently, authors in [31] show an attack
by brute force where it is possible to easily and quickly
obtain the ExpDate and the security code using only
the PAN. They carried out this attack first to obtain
the ExpDate from the PAN as follows: by using a
website that does not ask for the security code and
does not block this type of brute force attack, they
tested all possible combinations month/year taking into
account 5 years as a maximum duration of validity (12
months * 5 years = 60 tests). Once the ExpDate is
known, they proceeded to the second step to retrieve
in the same manner the security code. For this, they
used other websites that request the PAN, ExpDate and
the security code. Then, they reviewed all possibilities
for the security code, knowing that there are only one
thousand: 000 to 999. This operation can be relatively
fast if it is not blocked by servers.
– 6th Attack: as seen in [6] [12] [14], an attacker can
use the PAN and ExpDate to make fraudulent payments
on the internet without needing to provide the secu-
rity code: many websites such as "www.amazon.com",
"www.armaniexchange.com", "www.zappos.com" do
not request the security code. Additionally, if the
attacker manages to obtain the security code as in the
3rd attack, he can then use it on websites that require
the security code. In fact, in this type of attack, it is
assumed that: the victim has funds in his bank account,
the merchant of the website does not use any additional
security mechanism as the 3D secure [32] and that
the attacker is able to recover his parcels on postal
addresses where it will be difficult for the police to
follow him. We specify that the cardholder name is
never checked by websites and then the attacker can
use a random name. In section IV-B, we will show an
example of a purchase made on a website that does not
verify the name and does not require a security code.
– 7th Attack: an attacker can duplicate the bank card if
he manages to obtain the banking data (as shown in the
3rd, 4th and 5th Attacks). Then, he may fraudulently
use the duplicated card as in the case of the 1st attack.
– 8th Attack: in fact, an attacker can identify and track
the client using the PAN which is by default a sensitive
information [6].
• Because of V ulnerabilities (1) and (3)
– 9th Attack: in 2006, when all banks cards only sup-
ported the SDA authentication method (there were no
smartphones for payment), authors in [33] illustrated
that it was possible to create cloned SDA bank cards,
because the signature provided by the original bank
card is static and it is the same for each EMV transac-
tion. A cloned SDA card can be used to perform pur-
chase transactions with an offline PoS. Consequently,
a cloned SDA card can also be programmed to support
the CVM ’offline plain-text PIN’ and to respond with
"YES" to any PIN entered by the attacker [21]: the
name given to the cloned SDA cards is "YES cards".
Indeed, since 2013, most SDA cards have integrated
DDA and CDA as authentication methods because they
do not allow the cloning of cards. However, despite the
integration of DDA/CDA methods, authors in [14] [25]
and [26] demonstrate that an attacker can select in the
case of an offline PoS, which cannot communicate with
the banking network, the SDA method and fool both
PoS and C in order to execute the “YES cards” attack.
• Because of V ulnerabilities (4) and (5)
– 10th Attack: an attacker can authorize an EMV pur-
chase transaction by entering an incorrect PIN code
in the offline PIN case in the EMV phase 3. He then
modifies this phase as follows [27]:
> By first sending PoS a message indicating that the
PIN entered (by the attacker) is well verified by C
and that it is correct.
> Then, by informing C that the transaction is verified
by a handwritten signature and that no PIN is
required.
In fact, this attack cannot be detected in the actual
transaction phase because of: PoS believes that the
PIN verification has been successful and so it will
generate a zero byte in the TVR. C believes that
the PIN verification has not been attempted but a
handwritten signature has been required, so it will
accept the zero byte from the TVR and generates a
zero byte in the IAD. Finally, neither party can identify
the inconsistency between the TVR and the IAD. IB
will also consider that PoS has not been able to solicit
a PIN code and that the handwritten signature has been
chosen as a CVM.
In 2012, in France, several criminals were arrested
because they had exploited the EMV V ulnerabilities
(4) and (5) and performed 6000 fraudulent purchase
transactions mounting up to more than 500000 euros
[14].
• Another Attack:
– 11th Attack: authors in [34] illustrate that it is the-
oretically possible to falsify the EMV authentication
signatures: DDA or CDA. This attack is not practi-
cal because it is necessary to execute 4,639 partial
transactions by accessing C to generate the falsified
DDA/CDA signature. Also, each transaction lasts about
500ms and therefore, in order to achieve this attack,
one needs to have access to C for 38 minutes [14].
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B. Attacks Due to NFC Technology
• By default, NFC technology enables contactless commu-
nication between two devices within a short distance 5-
10cm [35]. Firstly, before introducing NFC technology
into payment applications, the EMV protocol has been
designed only to secure contact payments. After the
integration of NFC technology, EMV protocol has been
adapted without any change for contactless payments.
Indeed, EMVCo has assumed that an NFC purchase
transaction cannot exceed the short distance of 5-10cm.
However, authors in [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [36] [37]
[38], confirm that this assumption is very weak by
demonstrating the following attacks:
− 12th Attack: a relay attack is presented in [14] [36]
[37] [38] where it is possible to perform an NFC
purchase transaction using an NFC bank card C which
is at a distance of several kilometers from PoS. Addi-
tionally, the attacker has the possibility to eavesdrop
this NFC communication during the NFC purchase
transaction, and is able to retrieve the banking data
that are sent from C to PoS without encryption because
of V ulnerabilities (2.1) and (2.2) (see section II-A).
Afterwards, the attacker can use the retrieved data to
do a brute force attack or to harm the victim (see 5th,
6th, 7th, 8th Attacks in section III-A).
− 13th Attack (which is the same attack presented
in section I): a skilled attacker in radio-electronics,
can attach an amplifier to the NFC antenna of an
unauthenticated NFC reader (NFC smartphone, NFC
tablet, etc.) in order to reach a distance of NFC reading
up to 1.50 meters. The attacker can then remotely
steal the banking data (PAN, ExpDate) from several
bank cards, even if the latter are in the bag, without
the knowledge of the victims and without stealing the
physical cards [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]. In response
to the question (*) asked in section I, this attack is
also due because of V ulnerabilities (2.1) and (2.2)
and the attacker can do a brute force attack or harm
the victims as seen in the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Attacks
discussed in section III-A. In section IV-C, we will
illustrate an example of reading banking data using an
NFC smartphone.
• According to EMV specifications in [19] for NFC pay-
ment applications, an NFC purchase transaction can be
performed without the need to enter a PIN code if the
amount is less than 30 Euros in France. If the transaction
amount exceeds the maximum authorized limit, PoS then
asks the client to enter his PIN code. However, this EMV
specification only corresponds to the local currency of C
and authors in the experimental study [39] demonstrate
the following attack:
− 14th Attack: an attacker can use a French NFC bank
card to execute contactless purchases without entering
a PIN code for any amount in a foreign currency: in
dollars or pounds for example.
IV. TESTS AND DIAGNOSTICS
In this work, we have performed three experimental tests
illustrating the EMV V ulnerabilities {(2.1), (2.2)}.
A. 1st Test: Content of Payment Receipts
As presented in the 3rd Attack in section III-A, the client’s
receipt contains the PAN and ExpDate truncated, whereas the
merchant’s receipt contains the PAN and the ExpDate in clear.
In Figure 1, we illustrate an experiment that we have done in
agreement with a merchant who agreed to give us the receipts
printed by his PoS. The banking data are marked by a red
rectangle. In the client’s receipt, we can notice that the banking
data are truncated whilst in the merchant’s receipt they are in
clear (the blue band is to hide our data).
Fig. 1. PoS Proofs for Contact/NFC Purchase Transactions
Fig. 2. Adding Banking Data (Amazon) [6]
B. 2nd Test: Website Without Security Code
In the 6th Attack in section III-A, we have seen that
an attacker can perform fraudulent payment transactions on
the internet without the need to provide the security code
and the exact cardholder’s name. In Figure 2, we show a
test that we performed on the Amazon website. We only
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added the banking data: PAN, ExpDate and a random name to
"www.amazon.com" and we succeeded in buying many items.
Fig. 3. Data of an NFC Bank Card Read by an NFC Smartphone [6]
C. 3rd Test: Reading Banking Data
In section III-B, we referred that the assumption of EMVCo
in the case of NFC payment is very weak, where in the 13th
Attack it is possible for an attacker to remotely steal the
banking data from several bank cards by using an unauthenti-
cated NFC reader. In Figure 3, we were able to read the PAN
and ExpDate of a personal NFC bank card by using an NFC
smartphone ’Samsung S5’ with a free Android application
called NFC card reader [40]. We performed this test over a
distance of 1 cm because the antenna of our smartphone is not
efficient. Indeed, it is sufficient to attach a signal amplifier to
this smartphone to reach a distance of 1.50 meters.
V. CONCLUSION
EMV vulnerabilities represent major risks for our day to day
safety. The attacks presented in this paper threaten and harm
clients and merchants with the loss of their revenues: the C
device of a victim client can be fraudulently used without his
knowledge, and a merchant can sell his products while there
are no funds to receive. One of our objectives in this paper is
to answer to the question (*) asked in section I. In response,
the attack introduced in section I (which is the same as the
13th Attack) is due to the V ulnerabilities (2.1) and (2.2)
(see section II-A). These vulnerabilities lead also to several
attacks and dangerous risks: the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th
and 12th Attacks.
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